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TO USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FRG AND UK PAPERS ON ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0099

1. HERewith TEXTS OF UK AND FRG PAPERS PROVIDED WASHINGTON AGENCIES IN PREPARATION FOR TRILATERAL EXPERTS MEETING, AS REQUESTED REFTel. US CEILINGS PAPER IS BEING REDONE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS IN FRG AND UK PAPERS.

BEGIN TEXT UK PAPER.

1. MBFR: OPTION III: CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS. ON THE BASIS OF THE US PAPER OF 14 FEBRUARY AND THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION BETWEEN AMERICAN, GERMAN AND BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON ON 27 AND 28 FEBRUARY, BRITISH OFFICIALS HAVE FURTHER CONSIDERED THE PROBLEM OF CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT

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FORCES WHICH WOULD BE COVERED OR AFFECTED BY THE

INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III INTO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.
THE PRESENT PAPER IS NO MORE THAN A CONTRIBUTION TO
THE DEBATE AND SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A FORMAL
STATEMENT OF BRITISH VIEWS.

2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. OUR APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEM IS BASED ON FOUR BROAD CONSIDERATIONS. IN
OUR VIEW THE MEASURES FOR WHICH THE ALLIES SHOULD
AIM MUST

---- (A) IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ON THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
TO CONSTRAIN THE LEVELS OF THEIR TANKS AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THE GUIDELINES AREA;

-- (B) ALLOW THE ALLIANCE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE
LEVELS OF ITS TANKS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN
THE AREA, AND SAFEGUARD THE RIGHT OF THE ALLIES TO
REORGANIZE AND RE-EQUIP THEIR FORCES AS THEY THINK
BEST (EXCLUDING ANY SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS INCLUDED IN
MBFR AGREEMENTS);

-- (C) AVOID PREJUDICE TO THE PARTICULAR INTERESTS
OF THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, INCLUDING
THEIR FREEDOM TO COMPENSATE FOR ANY UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS
OF TANKS OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE ALLIANCE MIGHT CONCEIVABLY MAKE IN THE FUTURE;

-- (D) REPRESENT A REASONABLE BALANCE BETWEEN THE
CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT ABOVE IN NEGOTIATING TERMS.

THERE IS A FURTHER POINT OF SPECIFIC IMPORTANCE TO THE
UNITED KINGDOM. WE SHALL WISH TO ENSURE OUR FREEDOM
TO PROCEED BY 1978 WITH THE CONVERSION OF 30 BRITISH
F4 NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT NOW DEPLOYED IN THE GUIDELINES
AREA TO AN AIR DEFENCE ROLE AND THEIR REPLACEMENT IN
THE AREA BY 60 BRITISH JAGUAR AIRCRAFT IN THE DUAL
NUCLEAR STRIKE/CONVENTIONAL ATTACK ROLE.

3. SO FAR AS CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS ARE CONCERNED,
THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS RAISES PARTICULAR
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PROBLEMS (FOR EXAMPLE OVER VERIFICATION) WHICH ARE
NOT CONSIDERED IN THIS PAPER. IN OUR VIEW THEY MERIT
SEPARATE TREATMENT.

4. DEFINITIONS AND DATA. BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER
THERE IS AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED OVER
THE DEFINITION OF THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD BE
INCLUDED IN AN OPTION III AGREEMENT. WE DISTINGUISH

"NUCLEAR CAPABLE" FROM "NUCLEAR TASKED" SYSTEMS. NUCLEAR CAPABLE SYSTEMS ARE THOSE CAPABLE OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THUS ALL BRITISH F4S AND JAGUARS ARE TERMED DUAL CAPABLE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE TASK TO WHICH THEY ARE COMMITTED BECAUSE THEIR NUCLEAR WIRING REMAINS IN PLACE. WE BELIEVE THAT US F4S AND ALL

TYPES OF LANCE DEPLOYED IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA FALL INTO THE SAME CATEGORY. BY CONTRAST WE USE THE TERM NUCLEAR TASKED OR NUCLEAR COMMITTED TO DESCRIBE THOSE NUCLEAR CAPABLE SYSTEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN A NUCLEAR DELIVERY ROLE AND WHOSE CREWS HAVE BEEN TRAINED ACCORDINGLY. THUS OF THE 222 NUCLEAR CAPABLE US F4S DEPLOYED IN THE GUIDELINES AREA WE WOULD DESCRIBE ONLY 114 OF THEM AS NUCLEAR TASKED. AN ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR CAPABLE AND NUCLEAR TASKED SYSTEMS IS THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE FORMER IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA WOULD BE UNVERIFIABLE UNLESS PHYSICAL INSPECTION WERE PERMITTED, WHEREAS THE PRESENCE OF THE LATTER COULD BE VERIFIED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL AND OTHER MEANS.

5. WE ARE NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE ASSESSMENT OF THE HOLDINGS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT SET OUT ON PAGE 8 OF THE US PAPER OF 14 FEBRUARY IS IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE OR NUCLEAR TASKED SYSTEMS. WE ASSUME IT TO BE THE LATTER, BUT THINK THIS POINT SHOULD BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED AND APPROPRIATE TERMINOLOGY USED. SOME DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE TABLE IN THE US PAPER ARE ATTACHED AT ANNEX A.

6. TYPES OF CONSTRAINT. WE NOW CONSIDER THREE POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM. IN DOING SO WE HAVE USED
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AS A FRAMEWORK THE THREE ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM DISTINGUISHED IN THE US PAPER:

-- (A) LIMITATIONS ON RESIDUAL LEVELS OF US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SPECIFICALLY COVERED IN OPTION III AND ON SOVIET TANKS;

-- (B) LIMITATIONS ON US TANKS AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS;

-- (C) LIMITATIONS ON NON-US AND NON-SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS. FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY WE DESCRIBE THE THREE APPROACHES AS THE AMERICAN APPROACH, THE GENERIC APPROACH AND THE COMMON CEILING APPROACH.

7. A. THE AMERICAN APPROACH. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT
THE US ENVISAGE THE IMPOSITION OF THE FOLLOWING
CONSTRAINTS:

-- (A) A NARROWLY DEFINED LIMITATION ON US NUCLEAR
CAPABLE F4 AIRCRAFT AND ON US PERSHING SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILE LAUNCHERS; AND A NARROWLY DEFINED LIMITATION ON
SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

-- (B) NO SEVERE CONSTRAINT ON US TANKS AND SOVIET
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS BUT A FORM OF LIMITATION
WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE AMERICANS TO MAKE "MODEST"
INCREASES IN THEIR TANK FORCES WHILE RESTRICTING THE
RUSSIANS TO "MODEST" INCREASES IN THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES.

-- (C) A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE TO RESTRAIN
THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ONE HAND AND
THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THE OTHER FROM TAKING
MEASURES TO COMPENSATE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF US
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND SOVIET TANKS.

8. WE DOUBT WHETHER THIS APPROACH AS HERE STATED WOULD
MEET THE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 2
ABOVE. OUR REASONS ARE:

-- (A) WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD
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ACCEPT A CEILING ON ONE PARTICULAR TYPE OF US
AIRCRAFT UNLESS THE ALLIES AGREED THAT THE CEILING ON
SOVIET TANKS SHOULD ALSO BE CONFINED TO ONE TYPE (FOR
EXAMPLE THE T62). THIS WOULD CLEARLY BE UNSATISFACTORY.
NO CONSTRAINT WOULD THEREBY BE PLACED ON THE SOVIET T70.

-- (B) AS THERE IS NO SOVIET EQUIVALENT IN THE REDUCTION
AREA OF THE AMERICAN F4S AND PERSHING, WE SHOULD NOT
BE IN A POSITION TO DEMAND EQUALLY NARROW CONSTRAINTS
ON SOVIET NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILES.

-- (C) THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD BE UNLIKELY
TO AGREE THAT THE AMERICAN F4S COULD IN FUTURE BE
REPLACED BY OTHER TYPES OF AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ON A ONE-FOR-
ONE BASIS. IT WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULT TO AVOID
SPECIFIC CONSTRAINTS ON BRITISH AND GERMAN NUCLEAR
TASKED F4S AND ON GERMAN PERSHING.

-- (D) WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT THE "MODEST" INCREASES
(REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 7 (B) ABOVE) MEAN IN NUMERICAL
TERMS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO COME TO ANY JUDGMENT. IN

ANY CASE WE DOUBT IF IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO ALLOW ANY EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN MODEST INCREASES IN SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND MODEST INCREASES IN US TANKS. IF A NARROW DEFINITION-OF THE F4 WERE-A OPTED, THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE-ABLE MATERIALLY TO INCREASE THEIR HOLDINGS OF ALL TYPES OF NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT WHILE THE UNITED STATES WILL PROBABLY BE UNABLE TO AFFORD TO STATION ADDITIONAL TANK UNITS IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA OVER AND ABOVE THE TWO EXTRA BRIGADES NOW PLANNED.

-- (E) MOREOVER THERE IS A DANGER UNDER THE "MODEST" INCREASE PROPOSAL THAT WHEREAS THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT "MODESTLY" TO INCREASE THEIR TANK HOLDINGS AND THE SOVIET UNION THEIR NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, THEIR ALLIES WOULD NOT HAVE SUCH FREEDOM. A FURTHER DIFFICULTY IS THAT IF NON-US NATO FORCES AND NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES WERE PERMITTED TO MAKE MODEST INCREASES THEMSELVES, SUCH NATIONS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE GOOD A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF
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THE WITHDRAWALS UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION UNLESS SOME STRICT NUMERICAL LIMIT WERE SET. IF SUCH A LIMIT WERE DEFINED IN PERCENTAGE TERMS TO CATER FOR THE GERMAN REQUIREMENT TO INTRODUCE 300 EXTRA TANKS, IT COULD MEAN THAT THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD BE ABLE TO INTRODUCE AN EXTRA 700 TANKS AND SO PARTLY MAKE UP FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1700 SOVIET TANKS ENVISAGED IN PHASE I. A DISTINCTION WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO BE MADE BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE MODEST INCREASES IN THOSE EQUIPMENTS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT BEEN REQUIRED TO MAKE REDUCTIONS (TANKS IN THE CASE OF NATO AND NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE CASE OF THE WARSAW PACT) AND THE NEED FOR THOSE COUNTRIES NOT TO CIRCUMVENT BY MODEST INCREASES WITHDRAWALS OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND SOVIET TANKS.

-- (F) UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO FIND MEANS TO ENABLE THE NON-US MEMBERS OF NATO TO COMPENSATE FOR ANY UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS WHICH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT ONE DAY WISH TO MAKE IN THE FIELDS COVERED BY OPTION III.

THESE DIFFICULTIES MAY NOT BE INSURMOUNTABLE. BUT WE THINK THEY ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUGGEST THAT OTHER APPROACHES (WHICH WOULD NOT REDUCE THE NEGOTIATING VALUE OF OPTION III) SHOULD BE EXAMINED.

9. B. THE GENERIC APPROACH. THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE AMERICAN APPROACH AND THE GENERIC APPROACH IS THAT DEFINITIONS WOULD BE LESS NARROW. THE FOLLOWING CONSTRAINTS COULD BE ENVISAGED:

-- (A) LIMITATIONS ON US NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES IN GENERAL; AND LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

-- (B) LIMITATIONS ON US TANKS AS ENVISAGED IN THE

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AMERICAN APPROACH (PARAGRAPH 7B ABOVE); AND LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT (TO INCLUDE FITTER A AND C, FISHBED J, K AND L AND FLOGGER) AND ON SOVIET SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (INCLUDING FROGS, SCUDS AND (IMPLICITLY) SCALEBOARD).

-- (C) A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE TO COVER THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION RESPECTIVELY AS IN THE AMERICAN APPROACH (PARAGRAPH 7(C) ABOVE) SUBJECT TO THE COMMENT CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 8(E) ABOVE.

10. WE ADD THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN EXPLANATION:

-- (A) THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE DEFINITION OF US NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT FROM THAT SUGGESTED BY THE UNITED STATES AS THE F4 IS THE ONLY NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA.

-- (B) A CONSTRAINT ON US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES GENERALLY WOULD INCLUDE LANCES AS WELL AS PERSHING. BUT IN OUR VIEW IT WOULD NOT IMPOSE ANY DANGEROUS PRACTICAL CONSTRAINT ON THE ALLIANCE AS THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE ANY FUTURE REQUIREMENT TO INTRODUCE SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF US LANCES INTO THE AREA BEYOND THOSE ALREADY PLANNED. MOREOVER SHOULD THE SUCCESSOR TO PERSHING BE A SYSTEM CAPABLE OF ENGAGING THE RANGE OF TARGETS NOW WITHIN THE COMPASS OF LANCE AND PERSHING, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO REPLACE THESE TWO SYSTEMS ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS (UNDER THE AMERICAN APPROACH REPLACEMENT COULD ONLY BE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS IN EXCHANGE FOR PERSHING).

-- (C) SO FAR AS THE RUSSIANS ARE CONCERNED, THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REPLACE THE T62 BY THE T70 EXCEPT

ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS.

11. C. THE COMMON CEILING APPROACH. UNDER THIS APPROACH THERE WOULD BE A COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS (INCLUDING CANNON SECRET

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ARTILLERY) AND A COMMON CEILING ON MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE LEVELS CHOSEN FOR THESE COMMON CEILINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED BUT THEY MIGHT BE SOMEWHERE NEAR THE LEVELS REACHED BY NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT RESPECTIVELY FOLLOWING AN MBFR AGREEMENT. WITHIN THESE OVERALL NATO/ WARSAW PACT COMMON CEILINGS THERE WOULD BE SUB-CEILINGS SET AT DIFFERENT LEVELS ONLY ON US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT, SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES AND TANKS

AT THEIR POST-MBFR LEVEL. THERE WOULD BE NO SPECIFIC CONSTRAINT ON THE HOLDINGS OF NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT, SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS BY THE NON-US AND NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE OVERALL REQUIREMENT THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD COLLECTIVELY EXCEED THE COMMON CEILING.

12. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES:

-- (A) IN NEGOTIATING TERMS IT HAS AN ATTRACTIVE SIMPLICITY, AND THE ANALOGY WITH SALT COULD BE USEFUL. IT WOULD ALSO BE EASY TO JUSTIFY TO PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION.

-- (B) IT WOULD GIVE BOTH SIDES THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN IN ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA THE SAME NUMBER OF NUCLEAR TASKED WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE LATTER COULD BE AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND MILITARY POINT FOR NATO.

-- (C) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SUB-CEILING SUGGESTED ABOVE AND THE LIMITATION SUGGESTED IN THE AMERICAN OR GENERIC APPROACHES WOULD PROBABLY BE SMALL.

-- (D) IT WOULD MEET THE PROBABLE WARSAW PACT ARGUMENT THAT THE CONSTRAINTS PROPOSED UNDER THE AMERICAN OR GENERIC APPROACHES DID NOT CATER FOR NATO CANNON ARTILLERY. AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD PLACE A CONSTRAINT ON THE QUANTITY OF CANNON ARTILLERY WHICH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES MIGHT THEMSELVES WISH TO DEPLOY IN A NUCLEAR TASKED ROLE IN THE FUTURE.

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13. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS APPROACH HAS CERTAIN DISADVANTAGES:

-- (A) THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED TO INTRODUCE CANNON ARTILLERY WITH A NUCLEAR ROLE WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING.

-- (B) THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES COULD ARGUE THAT NO CONSTRAINT WAS PLACED ON NIKE HERCULES. THIS IS SO. BUT NOR WOULD ANY CONSTRAINT BE PLACED UPON THE WARSAW PACT'S EQUIVALENT SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES.
END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT FRG PAPER

1. THIS WORKING PAPER DEALS ONLY WITH THE CEILING ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH OPTION III. THE QUESTION OF THE NUMERICAL DEFINITION OF THE COMMON CEILING AS THE OBJECTIVE TO BE LINKED WITH OPTION III REMAINS TO BE SETTLED. IN OUR OPINION THE WEST SHOULD ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE WITH OPTION III A QUANTIFICATION OF THE COMMON CEILING.

--CEILING ISSUES

--TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. AFTER INTRODUCING OPTION III IN NATO THE BEST SUITED NATO-FORUM (FOR INSTANCE A REINFORCED SPC) WILL HAVE TO WORK OUT TWO PAPERS:

--A PAPER IN WHICH OUR OPTION III POSITION IS DEFINED AS CONCRETELY AND COMPREHENSIVELY AS POSSIBLE. THIS WOULD INCLUDE AN ANALYSIS OF THE CEILING ISSUES AND THE ALLIANCE POSITION. THIS PAPER WOULD HAVE THE CHARACTER OF AN INTERNAL GUIDELINE.

--A GUIDANCE FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III INTO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS GUIDANCE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND SHOULD NOT ADDRESS CEILING ISSUES. THIS POINT HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE IN THE LAST US-PAPER. WE AGREE WITH IT.

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3. WHEN INTRODUCING OPTION III INTO THE MBFR-NEGOTIATIONS WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR:

--THAT THE THREE REDUCTION ELEMENTS ARE EXCLUSIVELY
AMERICAN COMPONENTS

--THAT THESE THREE ELEMENTS ARE PART OF AN INTEGRAL
PACKAGE AND CANNOT BE UNRAVELLED

--THAT IN PARTICULAR EUROPEAN SYSTEMS SHALL NOT BE
INCLUDED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF
OPTION III WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER CEILING ISSUES WOULD BE
RAISED IN VIENNA. WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FACT
THAT THE ALLIANCE AVOIDS PERMANENT CEILING ARRANGEMENTS IN
PHASE I PARTICULARLY FOR EUROPEAN WEAPON SYSTEMS.

--GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING CEILING ISSUES

5. THE INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IS
INTENDED AS A UNIQUE MAKEWEIGHT TO REACH THE WEST'S PHASE I

NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES. WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT
THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III WILL NOT BE USED BY THE
OTHER SIDE TO BRING ABOUT GENERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR
WEAPONS OR TO UNRAVEL THE OPTION III PACKAGE.

6. IF THE SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR POTENTIAL WOULD REMAIN
ENTIRELY OUTSIDE OF MBFR WE WOULD RUN THE RISK THAT THE
SOVIET UNION WOULD TRY TO USE THIS FACT TO DESTABILIZE
THE BALANCE REACHED THROUGH MBFR. THIS CONCERN WOULD IN
ANY CASE PLAY A ROLE IN WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. IT IS
THEREFORE NECESSARY TO ENVISAGE TOGETHER WITH OPTION III A
LIMITATION OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR POTENTIAL.

7. IN COMPLEMENTING THE REDUCTION OPTION BY CEILING
ARRANGEMENTS WE WILL HAVE TO ASSURE ON THE WESTERN SIDE

--FLEXIBILITY FOR TRAINING AND ROTATION
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--OPTION TO REPLACE 54 DUAL CAPABLE AMERICAN F-4 BY
PURELY CONVENTIONAL TYPES

--MODERNIZATION OF THE WEAPON SYSTEMS AFFECTED

--ADAPTION OF THESE SYSTEMS TO THE TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENTS. INTRODUCTION OF NEW SYSTEMS (I.E. THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PMGS)

--POSSIBILITY OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS

--THE EUROPEAN COOPERATIVE OPTION.

8. TO SAFEGUARD THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL OPTION IS NATURALLY OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE FOR THE EUROPEAN ALLIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WILL HAVE TO BE KEPT IN MIND WHEN EXAMINING THE QUESTION WHICH COMPLEMENTARY EUROPEAN SYSTEMS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FOR LIMITATION.

--DEFINITIONS

9. WE AGREE WITH THE AMERICAN PAPER THAT A BROAD DEFINITION SHOULD BE USED FOR WARHEADS. WE HAVE TO MAKE CERTAIN HOWEVER THAT

--MODERNIZATION WILL NOT BE LIMITED

--LAUNCHERS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED

--DEPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS REMAIN OPEN.

10. AS SUGGESTED IN THE US PAPER IT IS, HOWEVER, PREFERABLE TO SEEK AS NARROW AND SPECIFIC A DEFINITION AS POSSIBLE FOR PERSHING AND F-4S.

A) THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS MAY BE EXAMINED:

--AMERICAN NUCLEAR CAPABLE F-4

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--AMERICAN NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT

--AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN A NUCLEAR ROLE.

THE MAIN PROBLEM LIES IN THE DEFINABILITY AND NEGOTIABILITY OF THE TERMS "NUCLEAR CAPABLE" AND "NUCLEAR ROLE." IN THE WEST NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT ARE AMONGST OTHERS F-4, F-104, F-111 (NOT IN NGA), JAGUAR, AND FUTURE MRCA, NOT, HOWEVER, FUTURE ALPHA-JETS. IN THE EAST THESE ARE, AS FAR AS WE KNOW: FITTER (SU-7), FLOGGER (MIG 23) AND FISHBED (MIG 21).

B) THE AMERICAN SUGGESTION TO SPECIFY PERSHING WOULD CORRESPOND TO OUR INTERESTS. IT LEAVES UNTOUCHED NECESSARY MODERNIZATION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW SYSTEMS.

AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE A DEFINITION BASED ON THE

CRITERION OF RANGE. A COMPARABLE SYSTEM DOES NOT (YET) EXIST IN THE EAST. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS CANNOT BE PREDICTED, HOWEVER. DEFINITION ACCORDING TO TYPES WOULD INCLUDE WESTERN SYSTEMS ONLY. WE COULD THEREFORE EXAMINE WHETHER SSMS WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 200 KM SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

THUS SCALEBOARD AS WELL AS SCUD B (RANGE 280 KM) WOULD BE COVERED.

CATEGORY 1: LIMITATIONS ON RESIDUAL LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS QUANTITATIVELY REDUCED

11. IN OUR VIEW LIMITATIONS OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT AND SSMS SHOULD BE AS CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE REDUCED WEAPON SYSTEMS AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS WAY WE COULD AVOID THE RISK OF PERMANENT INTERFERENCE OF THE OTHER SIDE WITH MODERNIZATION POLICIES OF THE WEST, A RISK WHICH WOULD BE CREATED BY A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT. WE MUST KEEP OPEN THE OPTION TO INTRODUCE TECHNICALLY IMPROVED SYSTEMS IN THE FUTURE, AT LEAST ON THE RATIO 1:1 GIVING THE OTHER SIDE NO RIGHT OF COMPLAINT. A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT WOULD--IT IS TRUE--ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN VIEW ONLY CONCERN SYSTEMS OF CATEGORY 3, HOWEVER, IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE DIFFICULT TO EXCLUDE REPERCUSSIONS ON THE REMAINING US SYSTEMS IN CATEGORY 1.

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12. IF WE WANT TO AVOID A "CONTINUED DIALOGUE" WHICH WOULD IN FACT AMOUNT TO THE OTHER SIDE'S BEING ENTITLED TO APPROVE MODERNIZATION IN THE WEST, THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ARRANGEMENT MUST BE DEFINED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT DEALS WITH QUANTITY, NOT WITH QUALITY.

13. WITH RESPECT TO THE CEILING OF TANKS THE SOVIET UNION WILL ASK FOR A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY THAT CORRESPONDS TO THE FLEXIBILITY WE WANT TO RESERVE FOR OUR NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. HERE ONE COULD TAKE A NARROW DEFINITION SUCH AS: MEDIUM BATTLE TANK.

BY DETERMINING THIS DEFINITION WE MUST GIVE HEED TO THE FACT THAT INEVITABLY THE SOVIET UNION WILL INSIST ON A SIMILAR DEFINITION FOR AMERICAN TANKS.'

--CATEGORY 2: LIMITATION ON ARMAMENTS NOT REDUCED

14. AMERICAN TANKS--THE DEFINITION OF AMERICAN TANKS SUBJECT TO A CEILING WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO CORRESPOND WITH THE DEFINITION OF SOVIET TANKS TO BE REDUCED. THE SOLUTION PROPOSED IN THE AMERICAN PAPER FOR THE MODALITIES OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT SEEMS APPROPRIATE. THIS PRESUPPOSES, HOWEVER, THAT THE NOTION OF "SIGNIFICANT INCREASE" CAN BE

DEFINED WITH SUFFICIENT CLARITY. A PERCENTAGE FIGURE OF 15 PERCENT ADDED AS ILLUSTRATION TO THE WORD "SIGNIFICANT" APPEARS TOO HIGH. APPLIED TO THE NON-SOVIET MBFR PARTICIPANTS OF THE WP, FOR EXAMPLE, 15 PERCENT OF THEIR TANK FORCES OF ABOUT 8,000 TANKS WOULD RUN UP TO 1,200 TANKS WHICH THEY COULD ADD WITHOUT VIOLATING THE AGREEMENT. THAT WOULD LARGELY COMPENSATE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,700 SOVIET TANKS (TANK ARMY), THE REMAINING DIFFERENCE IN OUR FAVOR ONLY BEING 500 TANKS.

15. IN THIS CONNECTION WE HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT COMPLEMENTING SOVIET TANK REDUCTIONS BY A CEILING ON AMERICAN TANKS WOULD LEAD TO CONTRACTUALIZING THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN THE NUMBERS OF TANKS. THEREFORE, WE MUST EXAMINE THE QUESTION WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE PREFERABLE WITH RESPECT TO TANKS TO CREATE A CEILING BY AN INDIRECT APPROACH, I.E. BY THE LIMITATION OF GROUND FORCES MANPOWER
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IN THE AGREED COMMON CEILING. THIS PROCEDURE WOULD ALLOW ON THE ONE HAND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO DEAL WITH THE EUROPEAN PROBLEMS IN THIS CONTEXT.

16. LIMITATION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS--IN THIS CONTEXT SPECIAL CARE MUST BE GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS STORED IN EASTERN EUROPE IS NOT KNOWN TO US AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD,

WILL NOT BE PREPARED TO REVEAL DATA IN THIS FIELD. IN CASE THAT THE AMERICAN ESTIMATE OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE NGA IS CORRECT, THIS SHOULD NOT BE SPELLED OUT IN AN AGREEMENT BECAUSE IT WOULD

--UNDERLINE EXISTING DISPARITIES

--POTENTIALLY OPEN UP A MARGIN FOR SOVIET INCREASES.

INSTEAD ONE COULD THINK OF A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR EXISTING--OR NON-EXISTING--SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEAD ARSENALS IN THE NGA, A NO-INCREASE WHICH COULD IN PRACTICAL TERMS AMOUNT TO A NO-INTRODUCTION AGREEMENT.

17. WITH RESPECT TO SSMS WE MUST MAKE SURE THAT SOVIET DEPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES MUST AT ANY RATE BE LIMITED TO THE EXISTING LEVEL. EITHER THE SCALEBOARD SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED AS THE EQUIVALENT OF THE PERSHING SYSTEM, OR THE CRITERION OF THE RANGE OF THE SYSTEM MUST BE INTRODUCED INTO THE DEFINITION OF THE CEILING, IN THIS WAY COVERING BOTH THE SCALEBOARD AND THE SCUD SYSTEM.

18. SOVIET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT--THE LIMITATION ON SOVIET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WILL DEPEND ON THE POSSIBILITY TO FIND A SUITABLE DEFINITION FOR "NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT" OR FOR "AIRCRAFT IN A NUCLEAR ROLE."

--CATEGORY 3: NON-AMERICAN-NON-SOVIET SYSTEMS

19. WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTICIPATING STATES WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A GENERAL NON-SECRET

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CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT WOULD ENTAIL A GREAT RISK OF INTERFERENCE FROM THE OTHER SIDE IN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF ARMAMENT. THIS QUESTION REQUIRES, OF COURSE, CAREFUL AND CRITICAL EXAMINATION.

20. LIMITATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF ARMAMENT IN THE STATES WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD, AT WORST, LEAD TO THEIR SEPARATION IN ARMS TECHNOLOGY FROM THEIR NEIGHBORS AND ALLIES. THIS WOULD RESULT IN THE CREATION OF A ZONE LIMITED IN ARMS AND QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM THE REST OF EUROPE. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION.

21. THE NATO NEGOTIATING CONCEPT STARTS FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO FOCUS MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON MANPOWER, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, OF GROUND FORCES. IT MUST, HOWEVER, BE EXPECTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL TRY TO USE

OPTION III FOR THE PURPOSE OF INCLUDING EUROPEAN ARMS SYSTEMS IN THE MBFR REDUCTION PROCESS. THIS CAN ONLY BE PREVENTED IF:

--ON OUR SIDE THE POSITION IS PRECISELY AND CONCRETELY DEFINED

-IT IS MADE CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE, THAT THE CONCEPT OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR US.

THIS MAKES IT NECESSARY FOR US TO DEVELOP A CONCRETE, CONVINCING AND YET NEGOTIABLE POSITION REGARDING THE LIMITATION OF EUROPEAN ARMS SYSTEMS.

22. THE IDEA OF A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE IN THE US PAPER DOES NOT MEET, IN OUR OPINION, THESE SPECIAL PROBLEMS. WITH ITS VAGUE FORMULATION IT WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO INTERFERE PERMANENTLY WITH THE INTERNAL

PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS OF MBFR.

23. AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM MUST BE BASED
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ON THE INTRINSIC LOGIC OF THE PRESENT NATO CONCEPT, I.E.
ON THE CONCENTRATION ON SOVIET AND US FORCES IN THE FIRST
PHASE AND ON THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. THIS
WOULD, IN OUR OPINION, BE POSSIBLE WITH THE FOLLOWING
NEGOTIATING POSITION:

A) THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION REQUIREMENTS COMPLEMENTING
SOVIET-AMERICAN PHASE I ARRANGEMENTS ARE MET ON THE PART
OF THE EUROPEANS BY THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR GROUND
AND AIR MANPOWER. THERE WILL BE NO PERMANENT LIMITATION
OF ARMAMENTS IN PHASE I.

B) IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT SOVIET MANPOWER WILL HAVE
TO BE REDUCED IN THE SECOND PHASE AS WELL, WHICH MAY EFFECT
THE SOVIET TANK POTENTIAL, THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION REQUIRE-
MENT COULD BE MET IN THE SECOND PHASE BY LIMITING THE
COLLECTIVE MANPOWER LEVEL. WE WOULD THUS AVOID TO CONTRAC-
TUALIZE THE DISPARITIES IN THE NUMBER OF TANKS AND TO
LIMIT EXPRESSLY THE NUMBER OF EUROPEAN TANKS.

C) ON COMPLETION OF THE COMMON CEILING IN THE SECOND
PHASE WE COULD CONSIDER A COLLECTIVE COMMITMENT NOT TO
INCREASE

--THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE AREA
OF REDUCTIONS

--THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF PERSHING (OR SSM WITH A
RANGE OF MORE THAN 200 KM)

--THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT.

24. AN ARRANGEMENT OF THIS SORT WOULD REQUIRE NATO INTER-
NAL AGREEMENT TO ASSURE

--US REDEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIES

--LOGISTIC CAPACITY FOR REDEPLOYED US OR OTHER
EUROPEAN COMPONENTS

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--OPTION FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS
WITH RANGES BELOW THE AGREED SSM LEVEL

--TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE AGREED AGGRE-
GATE NUMBER OF SSMS

--FLEXIBILITY IN DEPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT.

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